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The elicitation of uncertainty is a topic of interest in a 
range of disciplines. The conversion of expert beliefs into 
probability distributions can play a role in assisting key 
decisions in industry. However, elicitation methods can be 
prone to bias. In this paper we investigate the effect of 
changing the presentation of stimulus information and 
question format on elicited judgments of marginal, 
conditional and joint probabilities. Participants taught a 
probability distribution in one structure were expected to 
have difficulty assessing the distribution in another 
structure. While this pattern was not found, it turned out 
that training participants on the more difficult task 
(learning from a conditional structure) improved overall 
performance. 
Keywords: decision making; cognitive biases; elicitation; 
probability learning 
 
The “elicitation of uncertainty” is a general term that is 
often used to refer to methods for translating a set of 
implicit beliefs into an explicit probability distribution 
(Wolfson, 2001). The reason for using these methods is 
to allow researchers to incorporate subjective expert 
knowledge into a quantitative model that makes 
predictions about future events (Morgan & Keith, 1995). 
In view of this, good elicitation methods can play an 
important role in guiding decision making in a range of 
industries in which uncertain outcomes are central.  
One of the main impediments to widespread use of 
elicitation techniques in applied settings is the inherent 
difficulty of the task. This difficulty is caused by the 
many well-known decision-making heuristics and biases, 
which can distort the estimates of the underlying beliefs. 
For instance, anchoring and adjustment, 
representativeness, availability, base rate neglect and 
overconfidence (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Bar-
Hillel, 1980; Lichtenstein, Fischoff, & Phillips, 1982) 
have all been found to influence the judgments people 
make in an elicitation context, in both lay and expert 
populations (see, e.g., Eddy, 1982; Welsh, Bratvold & 
Begg, 2005). Moreover, people often mistake conditional 
probabilities for joint probabilities (Pollasek et al., 1987) 
since these are easier to compute (Lewis & Keren, 1999), 
and often experience difficulties with characterizing the 
conditioning event (Bar-Hillel & Falk, 1982). People may 
confuse one conditional probability P(A | B) with another 
P(B | A), or have difficulties interpreting instructions 
related to probability (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Fiedler et al., 
2000). 
Problem Representation 
A consistent finding in the decision-making literature is 
that people are sensitive to the surface representation of a 
problem. For instance: options described in terms of 
gains are evaluated differently to the same options when 
described in terms of losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979); changing the surface form of the Tower of Hanoi 
problem can alter the difficulty of the task (Gunzelmann 
& Blessing, 2000); and statistical problems expressed in 
terms of frequencies seem to be easier than the same 
problems described in terms of probabilities (Gigerenzer 
& Hoffrage, 1995). 
One interesting variation on the question of problem 
representation arises when people need to learn about and 
report on the joint distribution of two variables, A and B. 
Mathematically, we can describe the distribution to be 
learned and subsequently elicited in three formally 
equivalent ways, by noting that: 
 
         P(A, B) = P(A | B) P(B) = P(B | A) P(A)        (1) 
 
For the current purposes we refer to each of these three 
variations as a “problem format”, and note that while all 
three formats describe to the same distribution over A and 
B, there is no guarantee that people will treat them as 
such. Indeed, in view of the known differences in how 
people estimate marginal probabilities, conditional 
probabilities and joint probabilities, we would expect to 
observe fairly substantial differences between formats.  
In this paper we describe an experiment that examines 
(1) whether one format for the problem leads to superior 
learning and subsequent probability estimation in general, 
and (2) whether learning in one format makes it easier to 
report on questions framed in the same format.  Should 
either of these two effects be observed, a natural method 
for improving elicitation in an applied context would be 
to alter the presentation format to be more suited to the 
expectations of the expert whose beliefs are to be elicited.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 60 students (18 male) studying at the 
University of Adelaide, aged 18 to 37 years, and were 
paid $15 for their time. 
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Procedure 
The experiment involved three learning tasks, and two 
testing conditions, and the measurement of several key 
covariates. All participants completed all three learning 
tasks, but were tested in only one of the two testing 
conditions (based on a random assignment to one of two 
groups). The basic procedure was as follows. Participants 
were individually tested in a quiet, well-lit room in front 
of a computer. Firstly, basic demographic data were 
collected. Participants then did a simple practice task to 
demonstrate how the interface works and to illustrate 
what they would be tested on. Participants then undertook 
all three learning-plus-elicitation tasks in a random order, 
with the covariate measurement tasks (APM & MHV; see 
later) used as filler tasks to help prevent order effects and 
learned probabilities from previous urn distributions 
affecting recall of later distributions. Participants were 
not allowed to use external resources (e.g., pen and paper, 
calculator) to aid calculations. 
The learning tasks 
The experiment involved showing participants 20 
“candies” which could vary in color (red or blue) and 
shape (circle or triangle). The participants’ task was to 
learn the distribution over colors and shapes.  The 
experiment was conducted on computer, and the interface 
was designed so that the stimuli could be presented to 
participants in all three formats (i.e., P(A, B), P(A | B) 
P(B) and P(B | A) P(A)). The cover story told participants 
that they had encountered a “vending machine” (which 
we refer to as the urn) filled with candies, which was 
varied slightly between conditions. Participants were 
shown the 20 candies one at a time: each candy appeared 
after the participant clicked on a “vend” button (see 
Figure 1). After viewing all candies, they were asked 
various elicitation questions (described later). 
In the wrapped candy condition, participants were told 
that the candy was covered in a yellow wrapper. As a 
result, when they clicked on the “vend” button (see 
Figure 1) they would be able to see the shape of the 
candy but not its color. If they then clicked the “unwrap” 
button, the color would be revealed. Because of the 
sequential way in which the stimulus characteristics were 
revealed, the format in which “the world” presents the 
items is naturally described in terms P(color | shape) P( 
shape). 
In the masked candy condition, the distribution was 
also shown to people in a sequential fashion. However, 
the color of the candy was shown before the shape, so 
that participants would see items in a P(shape | color) 
P(color) format. The cover story in this case implied that 
the participants were initially viewing the candies 
through a small window, so they could see the color but 
not the shape. In this condition, the “unwrap” button was 




Figure 1: GUI of wrapped candy condition. Vended 
circular candy (a) unwrapped to reveal blue color (b). 
Percentage estimate requested (c) before confidence 
rating (d). All GUIs presented the same basic layout. 
 
The unveiled candy condition was the simplest of the 
three, and presented the two features together as soon as 
the participants clicked on the “vend” button. As a 
consequence, participants observed the joint distribution 
P(color, shape) in a more direct fashion. 
To allow for between-participant comparisons, the base 
rate for each type of candy was preset in all three 
conditions (see Table 1). The shape and color of each 
candy was randomly determined at each trial. After 
completing 20 trials, the elicitation questions were asked. 
The elicitation questions 
Participants answered 10 possible questions about the 
percentage of particular candies in a future urn 
distribution (two regarding marginal probabilities, four 
conditional probabilities, and four joint probabilities). 
The questions were asked in a random order. Participants 
in group 1 were asked to give estimates in terms of a 
“shape preceding color” structure. These estimates were 
therefore elicited in the same format in which the 
distribution of candies was learnt in the wrapped candy 
condition (e.g., P(circle), P(red | circle), P(red, circle) 
etc). Participants in group 2 were requested to give 
estimates in terms of a “color preceding shape” structure, 
hence estimates were elicited in the same format in which 
the distribution of candies was learnt in the masked candy 




Thus, in order to produce estimates, participants in group 
1, for example, needed to “flip” the probability 
distribution (using Bayes’ theorem) that they learnt for 
candies in the masked candy condition (see Table 1). As 
shown in Figure 1, the elicited percentage was typed in 
an editable text box. Additionally, for every probability 
judgment that participants were asked to make, they were 
subsequently asked rate their confidence in their 
accuracy, using a horizontal scroll bar to enter a value 
that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (highly). This process 
was repeated for each elicitation question. All GUI 
controls were sequentially locked and unlocked to 
prevent backtracking and to ensure that the participant 
answered questions in the prescribed order.  
Covariate controls 
Given that participants with higher cognitive functioning 
have been found to perform better on tasks involving 
conditional reasoning (Stanovich & West 1998) and to be 
less susceptible to overconfidence (Pallier et al., 2002), 
intelligence measures were included as controls. Bors and 
Stokes’ (1998) short form of Raven, Court and Raven’s 
(1988a) Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) was used 
to measure fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence 
was measured using Senior Form 1 of the Mill Hill 
Vocabulary Scale (MHV) (Raven, Court, & Raven, 
1988b). Finally, information regarding participants’ TER 
(percentile Tertiary Entrance Rank derived from 
students’ performance in the final year of secondary 
education in several Australian states) was collected. 
Results 
The accuracy of any given judgment was assessed in 
terms of the absolute error – the magnitude of the 
difference between the empirical probability experienced 
by the participant, and the participant’s subjective 
estimate of that probability. Since the distribution of 
absolute errors was skewed to the right, a log 
transformation was performed on absolute error data 
points prior to model fitting (with the addition of 1 to 
each data point to prevent negative values). 
Order, format and question type effects 
It was hypothesized that participants taught a probability 
distribution in one conditional structure would have 
difficulty estimating probabilities in another conditional 
structure. Since group 1 participants were asked to 
answer questions consistent with the format learnt in the 
wrapped candy condition (i.e., a shape preceding color 
structure), they were expected to give estimates closer to 
the empirical rate than would group 2 participants. The 
same was expected for group 2 participants in the masked 
candy condition (i.e., a color preceding shape structure). 
Because a joint distribution was presented in the unveiled 
candy condition, question format was expected to have 
no effect on performance in either group. 
Table 1: Base rates of candy color (red or blue) and shape 
(circle or triangle) and consistency of question format 
with presentation of candy features in each of the three 
conditions for group 1 and group 2. Since the unveiled 
candy condition contained a joint distribution, question 
format was neither consistent nor inconsistent. 
 
 Condition 
 Wrapped Masked Unveiled  
 Average base rate (%) 
Color    
Red  10 30 30 
Blue 90 70 70 
Shape    
Circle 30 90 30 
Triangle 70 10 70 
 Format consistent 
Group 1    
Shape, color Yes No – 
Group 2    
Color, shape No Yes – 
 
Examination of the relationship between questions of 
conditional probability and log absolute error in Figure 
2a) showed what may be weak evidence for the predicted 
effect. That is, group 1 produced better conditional 
probability estimates in the wrapped candy condition, and 
group 2 produced better conditional probability estimates 
in the masked candy condition. There was also an effect 
of question type with the log absolute error score highest 
on questions of conditional probability (see Figure 2b). 
Note that in the experimental phase there were four sets 
of questions that should sum to 100%: questions 1 and 2, 
which concerned marginal probabilities; 3 and 4; 5 and 6, 
which concerned conditional probabilities; and 7 to 10, 
which asked for joint probabilities. Errors within each set 
should therefore be positively correlated (e.g., if a 
participant estimated 50% of candies would be circular 
when the true value was 25%, the absolute error would be 
25% and a similar absolute error score would thus be 
expected in their estimate of triangular candies). 
Moreover, there were participant-level correlations – 
some participants consistently had poorer or better 
performance than others. Linear mixed effects models 
were therefore fitted to further investigate the effect of 
condition (wrapped candy, masked candy and unveiled 
candy), group (1 or 2) and question type (marginal, 
conditional or joint) on absolute error while adjusting for 
interdependence of the data. 
To adjust for the dependence in estimates within the 
same question set and within estimates from the same 
participant for a condition, random effects for participant 
and question set × condition × participant were added to 
the linear mixed effects models. Condition, group and 
question type were treated as fixed effects (predictor 
variables)   in   the   model.   The   three-way   interaction  
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Figure 2: Mean log absolute error scores, with 95% confidence intervals, for (a) group 1 and 2 estimates of conditional 
probability in the wrapped and masked candy conditions; (b) combined estimates of marginal, conditional and joint 
probability; and (c) combined estimates in wrapped, masked and unveiled candy conditions. Group 1 N = 30, Group 2 N = 30. 
Sample size of estimates is N = 240 in each candy condition in (a); N = 120 for marginals, N = 240 for conditionals, N = 240 
for joint in (b); and N = 600 for each candy condition in (c). 
 
between these variables and all two-way interactions 
were examined. APM, MHV and TER scores were also 
included as fixed effects in the models to assess their 
influence on absolute error. Degrees of freedom were 
calculated using the containment method (see Littell et 
al., 1996). 
There were no significant interactions so interaction 
effects were removed from the model. Significant main 
effects were found for question type F(2, 1061) = 31.38, 
p <.001; and condition (i.e., urn type), F(2, 1061) = 4.75, 
p < .01, as can be seen in Figures 2b) and 2c). 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated questions of 
conditional probability (adjusted M = 2.18, SE = .10) 
were associated with higher log absolute error relative to 
questions of marginal probability, (adjusted M = 1.71, SE 
= .11), F(1, 1061) = 25.40, p <.001; and questions of 
joint probability, (adjusted M = 1.61, SE = .11), F(1, 
1061) = 55.20, p <.001. 
The unveiled candy condition (adjusted M = 2.03, SE = 
.12) had a significantly higher log absolute error than the 
wrapped candy condition, (adjusted M = 1.68, SE = .12), 
F(1, 1061) = 9.12, p < .01 and masked candy condition, 
(adjusted M = 1.79, SE = .12), F(1, 1061) = 4.12, p = .04. 
Intelligence and accuracy 
Participants with higher APM, MHV and TER scores 
were expected to provide more accurate probability 
estimates and a significant main effect was found for 
APM, (F(1, 1061) = 3.20, p = .04). Looking at Table 2, it 
seems that MHV scores were also weakly related to 
accuracy on the estimation task, with 8 of 9 correlations 
in the predicted direction (p = .002 by a sign test), four of 
which were significant in their own right. TER scores, 
however, had no predictive power. Independent samples 
t-tests confirmed that there was no significant difference 
between  groups on the covariates, specifically: the APM 
 
(group 1 M = 10.47, SD = 2.16; group 2 M = 10.77, SD = 
2.93; t(58) = –.45, p = .65); and MHV (group 1 M = 
58.37, SD = 10.48; group 2 M = 56.40, SD = 10.53; t(58) 
= .73, p = .47).   
 
Table 2: Spearman correlations between MHV score, 
APM score, TER score and log absolute error broken 
down by question type. 
 











Marginal MHV –.08 –.11 .01 
 APM –.29** –.23** –.20* 
 TER
a
 –.13 .02 .20 
Conditional MHV –.09 –.11* –.08 
 APM –.06 –.11 –.26** 
 TER
a
 .12 .05 .02 
Joint MHV –.16** –.15** –.12* 
 APM –.10 –.12* –.19** 
 TER
a
 –.06 .03 –.02 
Note.*p < .05, **p < .01, one–tailed. N = 60, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
a
n = 41. Sample size of estimates is 
N = 120 for marginals, N = 240 for conditionals, N = 240 
for joint. 
Confidence and accuracy 
It was predicted that confidence ratings would decrease 
as absolute error scores increase. All correlations were 
significant and in the expected, negative direction (see 
Table 3). 
Linear mixed effects models were also fitted to assess 
the relationship between confidence rating and absolute 


















































absolute error was highly significant – with every one 
unit increase in confidence rating, log absolute error was 
expected to decrease by –.19 units. That is, an 
approximately 20% reduction in absolute error, t(1559) = 
–7.31, p <.001. No significant interaction effects were 
found but a significant main effect was found for 
condition, F(2, 1061) = 14.69, p <.001. 
 
Table 3: Spearman correlations between confidence 
rating and log absolute error broken down by question 
type and condition. 
 
 Condition 
Question type Wrapped Masked Unveiled 
  Marginal –.32** –.22** –.31** 
  Conditional –.25** –.20** –.13* 
  Joint –.27** –.16** –.19** 
Note.*p < .05, **p < .01, one–tailed. N = 60. Sample size 
of estimates is N = 120 for marginals, N = 240 for 
conditionals, N = 240 for joint. 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated confidence ratings 
were significantly lower for the unveiled candy condition 
(M = 3.92, SE = .20) compared to the wrapped candy 
condition (M = 4.57, SE = .20), F(1, 1061) = 28.41,  
p < .001; and the masked candy condition (M = 4.35, SE 
= .20), F(1, 1061) = 12.53, p = <.001. 
Discussion 
In this study we found no significant evidence to suggest 
that performance on probability estimation tasks changes 
as a function of the order in which information is 
acquired. When items were presented in the P(A | B) P(B) 
format, there was no advantage to eliciting participants’ 
knowledge in this same format, as compared to eliciting 
the knowledge in the P(B | A) P(A) format. However, we 
did find that participants who were shown the stimuli in 
the P(A, B) format actually had significantly higher error 
than participants taught in either of the other two formats, 
regardless of what type of question was asked. Given that 
joint probabilities are presumably easier to process than 
conditionals, one possibility is that this is a depth of 
processing effect (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Recall that, 
when studying urns with a conditional structure, 
participants were presented with one characteristic of the 
candy at a time. This two stage learning process 
presumably required more attention, involvement and 
time spent to process each stimulus than the one stage 
learning process of the joint distribution. This may have 
contributed to the improvement in overall performance, 
precisely because the task is harder. 
The expected effect of question type was also 
observed. Absolute error was smallest on questions   
related to marginal probabilities, and largest on questions 
related to conditional probability. This was observed 
regardless of question format or distribution format. 
These findings are consistent with previous research (see, 
e.g., Lewis & Keren, 1999), as is the relationship 
between accuracy and intelligence (see Stanovich & 
West, 1998). Finally, participants did seem to be aware of 
how accurate their performance was, since confidence 
and accuracy were related in a sensible fashion. 
Future directions 
Our finding that training on the more difficult task 
improves elicitation warrants further investigation.  
Future research could determine whether performance is 
improved by only the two stage learning process used 
here or by any training format that fosters increased depth 
of processing. 
Limitations 
Before concluding, it is worthwhile considering the 
limitations of this study. It should be noted, for example, 
that participants provided estimates for each urn 
distribution based on only 20 trials, which may not have 
been sufficient for them to form strong beliefs about the 
distribution. Increasing the number of trials to 100 might 
allow participants to get a better sense of the underlying 
distributions, while a larger sample size would enable a 
clearer understanding of the results; for example, 
clarifying whether the suggestive results seen in Figure 
2a) actually reflect the hypothesized interaction between 
learnt distributional formats and probability estimates. 
A secondary concern is the level of control over the 
empirically observed rates; although the “true” base rate 
for each urn was the same, random draws from the true 
distribution contain sampling error that results in 
participants observing slightly different empirical rates 
from each other, diluting control over the experiment. 
One solution to this would be to use a pseudo-random 
distribution with a fixed empirical rate, rather than the 
truly probabilistic approach taken here. 
A third possibility is that the sequential presentation 
method did not have a strong effect because only one 
stimulus (the candy) was perceived. That is, the nature of 
the task may have undermined the experimental 
manipulation to some extent. A task in which A and B 
refer to distinct but causally related stimuli (instead of 
two features of a single object) might provide a better test 
of the hypothesis. 
Conclusions 
Although one of the main predicted effects did not 
appear, the overall results paint an intriguing picture of 
the potential impacts that training format can have on 
elicited probability estimates. For example, the fact that 
training people on the harder task improves estimates is 
interesting, and of potential applied value. The longer-
term goal is thus to see how well these findings can be 
adapted to improve the elicitation of uncertainty in real 
world contexts.  
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